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a b s t r a c t
Our fundamental research interest is in exploring the ways in which the ﬁnancial markets
have adapted to Reg FD, and our particular focus is on how market participants use industry
information embedded in ﬁrms’ earnings announcements. We ﬁnd that announcements of
quarterly earnings made by companies that are the ﬁrst in their industry to report in a given
quarter have signiﬁcant effects on the stock returns of other ﬁrms in the same industry as
well as on their own stock returns. We then test the implications of these ﬁndings for their
effects on the information environment. Overall, our empirical ﬁndings support the conclusion that the implementation of Reg FD has led to increased use of industry information that
is revealed in earnings announcements. This is one way, among others, in which analysts
and other market participants have adapted to the requirements of Reg FD. In this case,
they have made the adaptation by developing new uses of public information to enhance
the informational environment.
Published by Elsevier Inc.

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2000 with the
aim of increasing fairness in the stock market. It requires corporations to disclose material information publicly to provide a
more level playing ﬁeld, but also allows ﬁrms to disclose non-material information privately, recognizing that some analysts
may be able use this information in conjunction with other information to form a more complete view of the ﬁrm’s prospects.
When the SEC sought public comment on the proposed rule, there was both strong support and considerable concern. The
investing public supported it with the expectation that material information would no longer be selectively released to
professional analysts, thereby levelling the informational playing ﬁeld. On the other hand, many investment professionals
expressed concern that Reg FD would have a chilling effect if it resulted in less information being released. Since Reg FD
became effective, a key research objective has been to determine whether it has successfully achieved its fundamental goals
of increasing transparency and fairness, and whether and how market participants have modiﬁed their behavior as a result
of it.
Among the research ﬁndings on the effects of Reg FD, several empirical studies conclude that analysts have less access
to selective information and have been led to work harder to analyze ﬁrms. Reviewed more fully below, these include
Mohanram and Sunder (2006), Janakiraman, Radhakrishnan, and Szwejkowski (2007), Mensah and Yang (2008), and Kross
and Suk (2012). Additional studies show how analysts have attempted to replace lost information or have identiﬁed ways
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in which ﬁrms have changed the means through which they convey information. Among others, these include Jorion and
Zhang (2007), Heﬂin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003), Agapova, Madura, and Mailibayeva (2012), and Bushee, Matsumoto,
and Miller (2004)
Overall, the body of research supports the conclusion that Reg FD has successfully led to reduced selective information
releases to analysts and favored investors, and to fairer markets in general. Despite that, there are some concerns that
managers and analysts have been able to develop ways in which they communicate and receive privileged information
on a selective basis. On the more positive side, the implementation of Reg FD has encouraged analysts and other market
participants to utilize new types of information to replace information no longer available from ﬁrms. This provides the
underlying motivation of our analysis of industry-wide effects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
In this paper we test one particular way in which market participants may seek to utilize a source of information that
enhances the informational environment within which stock prices are determined. Speciﬁcally, we examine the effects
of earnings surprises on the stock returns of the reporting ﬁrms and, in addition, their industry rivals. We test whether
potential industry effects are stronger or weaker after the implementation of Reg FD. If stronger, it suggests that under Reg
FD, industry information is more useful and has greater value to market participants. It also indicates one way in which
investors have developed a new source of information as a result of Reg FD, and lends additional support to prior ﬁndings
that analysts work harder as a result of Reg FD.
Our empirical analysis begins with an examination of industry effects based on the stock price reactions of rival ﬁrms
after one ﬁrm in the same industry announces its earnings. We hypothesize that if information regarding earnings prospects
or the competitive nature of an industry is conveyed in earnings reports by its member companies, it is the ﬁrst report
among all that should have the best chance to inform the market as investors modify their valuation on all stocks in the
industry. We thus examine news releases of quarterly earnings made by companies that are the ﬁrst in their industry to
report earnings in a given quarter.
We ﬁnd that earnings surprises have industry-wide effects that are on average in the same direction as those of the ﬁrst
ﬁrm to report. For example, if the ﬁrst to report announces earnings that are signiﬁcantly higher than expected, there is not
only a positive response in its own stock price, but also a positive response in those of other ﬁrms in the same industry.
We next compare the abnormal returns around earnings announcements before and after the implementation of Reg FD.
We ﬁnd that after implementation, the 2-day abnormal returns around earnings announcements are larger than prior to the
announcement. This applies to both the reporting ﬁrms and their competitors. We interpret this as consistent with analysts
having less private information before and at the time of the announcement. This is also consistent with prior research
ﬁndings that Reg FD has been successful in helping to level the informational playing ﬁeld.
Finally, we examine the impact of Reg FD on the stock price reactions of both reporting and rival ﬁrms in a multivariate
setting. Our key empirical ﬁnding is that earnings surprises of the ﬁrst-to-report ﬁrms have more signiﬁcant effects on the
returns of the industry rivals after Reg FD was implemented than before. We conclude that the implementation of Reg FD is
associated with greater use of industry information by analysts and other market participants in the price discovery process.
Our empirical ﬁndings provide a new and unique perspective of the complex effects of Reg FD on the nature of the
information provided in corporate earnings announcements. Our contribution is that we identify a way in which the market
appears to have adapted to the implementation of Reg FD by mining a new source of information. In the case of industry
spillover effects, the information may always have existed, but its value has been enhanced as a result of Reg FD.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we review prior research on the effects of Reg FD and industry
effects. In Section 2 we develop testable hypotheses. We then describe our data and empirical methodology. Empirical results
and implications are presented next. Section 9 summarizes our ﬁndings and conclusions.
1. Related research
Our research draws on several streams of prior research: the effects of Reg FD, industry-wide effects of corporate
announcements, and earnings surprises.
In a comprehensive review and synthesis of academic studies of the effects of Reg FD, Koch, Lefanowicz, and Robinson
(2013) identify several distinct threads of research. The ﬁrst is analyses of stock returns and trading volume to test how Reg
FD has affected the ﬁnancial markets. Another examines measures of information asymmetry, such as bid/ask spreads and
the adverse selection component of transactional costs. The third deals with the effects of Reg FD on analysts, and the last
is on changes in corporate communications, especially with reference to a ﬁrm’s ability to disclose information via private
meetings with investors and analysts.
In evaluating the effects of Reg FD, many researchers use event study methodology to compare market reactions to similar
information issued before and after the regulation became effective. For example, Jackson and Madura (2007) compare effects
of proﬁt warnings issued by companies before and after the implementation of Reg FD to determine whether it alters how
the market processes the information. They ﬁnd a diminishing negative effect of proﬁt warnings after the implementation
of Reg FD and interpret this as a sign that investors rely less on proﬁt warning announcements after Reg FD came into effect.
They conclude that the implementation of Reg FD has effectively prevented the ﬂow of material information to analysts
before other market participants.
Many other studies in this area also ﬁnd that Reg FD is associated with a reduction in the availability of non-public
information to analysts. Examples are Agrawal, Chen, and Chadha (2006), who ﬁnd that analysts’ earnings forecasts are
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less accurate and more disperse after Reg FD; Bhojraj, Cho, and Yehuda (2012), who ﬁnd reductions in performance of
mutual funds in large fund families; Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis (2008), who ﬁnd higher adverse selection costs; and
Li, Saunders, and Shao (2015), who ﬁnd an increased level of information asymmetry in the credit markets.
Of greatest relevance to our study are papers that deal with the degree of analyst efforts. Mohanram and Sunder (2006),
for example, document that on average analysts follow fewer ﬁrms after Reg FD was implemented, suggesting that they
need to devote more effort to each ﬁrm. They also ﬁnd that many analysts have shifted their coverage to ﬁrms that have
fewer competing analysts. Janakiraman et al. (2007) ﬁnd that analysts tend to publish their ﬁrst earnings forecasts later in the
quarter after implementation, consistent with the expectation that it takes longer for them to gather and process information
available, as well as with the problem of having less private information to work with. Mensah and Yang (2008) ﬁnd that
after implementation, analysts tend to exhibit less herding behavior, in which they tend to publish similar estimates. This
supports the conclusion that analysts are working harder to develop their own forecasts, as opposed to more easily following
the consensus of others following the same stocks. Finally, Kross and Suk (2012) ﬁnd that analysts revise their forecasts more
quickly after public ﬁrm announcements after implementation. Together, these studies support the conclusion that Reg FD
has led to greater effort on the part of analysts, who must ﬁnd new sources of information and work harder to differentiate
their recommendations and forecasts from others.
Additional research has focused on alternate disclosure channels, such as information available to credit-rating agencies
Jorion and Zhang (2007), increased use of earnings guidance Heﬂin et al. (2003), and Agapova, Madura, and Mailibayeva
(2012), and changing previously closed conference calls to open calls (Bushee et al., 2004). Pursuing this line of inquiry
more deeply, much recent research attempts to infer ways in which managers are still able to provide selective access to
analysts. Bushee et al. (2013), for example, ﬁnd evidence that some CEO presentations at invitation-only investor conferences
are followed by proﬁtable trades, and that there are “off-line” meeting times at many of these conferences. Green, Jame,
Markov, and Subasi (2014) examine corporate ﬂight logs to money centers, and ﬁnd that institutional investors in those
areas increase their trades and holdings of the stocks of those ﬁrms.
The general conclusion supported by this body of research is that the degree of selective information releases to analysts
and favored investors is lower after the implementation of Reg FD. Although some managers and analysts may have been
able to communicate and receive privileged information on a selective basis,1 Reg FD has also led to efforts to utilize new
types of information to replace information no longer directly available.
Lang and Stulz (1992) are among the earlier researchers to study the industry effects of corporate announcements.
They argue that these effects may consist of two separate effects: contagion and competitive effects. The contagion effect
dominates when the ability to generate earnings or cash ﬂows is similar among industry competitors, and the competitive
effect dominates if weakness in earnings of the reporting ﬁrm implies opportunities for its competitors.
Their empirical tests are on industry information revealed by one ﬁrm’s announcement of bankruptcy. Overall, they ﬁnd
that bankruptcy announcements of one ﬁrm may have a positive or negative effect on competitors in the same industry,
depending on whether the competitor is perceived as suffering from the same problems or whether it may be able to beneﬁt
competitively. In the case of highly leveraged industries and industries where stock prices of industry members are highly
correlated, competitor ﬁrms tend to exhibit more negative (contagion) effects from individual company’s bankruptcy news.
By contrast, industries with high concentration and low debt-to-asset ratios are more likely to show positive (competitive)
effects on non-bankrupt ﬁrms of the same industry in the event of a member ﬁrm’s bankruptcy.
In a study of industry effects of information in the banking sector, Prokopczuk (2010) uses negative earnings surprises
to demonstrate how the stock price impact of negative ﬁrm-speciﬁc information can spread to competitors. After ﬁnding
signiﬁcant contagion effects of negative earnings surprise news in the banking sector (but not non-banking sectors), he
suggests that effective banking regulation should be directed at the level of banking networks instead of individual banks.
Akhigbe, Madura, and Newman (2006) examine the industry effects of revisions of buy and sell recommendations on a
ﬁrm’s industry rivals. They ﬁnd that on average the effects are consistent with contagion, although there is evidence of a
competitive effect in some cases. Their sample covers revisions in the years 1997–2002, although they do not test explicitly
for the effect of Reg FD.
These streams of research form the background for our study. We test whether the implementation of Reg FD is associated
with enhanced industry effects of corporate earnings announcements.
2. Testable hypotheses relating to the effects of Reg FD
Our ﬁrst hypothesis deals with the question of whether the earnings surprise of one ﬁrm has effects on the stock returns
of another ﬁrm in the same industry. We expect that there are signiﬁcant industry effects, and this is the basis for our analysis
of the effects of Reg FD. Expressed in null form:
H1. Given that earnings surprise news is ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than industry-wide, earnings surprises by the ﬁrst reporting
ﬁrm of an industry in a given quarter should result in no abnormal returns for competitor companies’ stock prices.

1
Loh and Stulz (2011) test for the inﬂuence of analysts and ﬁnd that inﬂuential analyst recommendation changes are actually somewhat more likely
after Reg FD came into effect than before.

4

S. Yu, G. Webb / Journal of Economics and Business 89 (2017) 1–12

Jackson and Madura (2007) argue that the stock price reaction to earnings announcements should be more pronounced
after Reg FD was implemented because under the regulation, the preferential ﬂow of material information to analysts and
large investors of a company is impeded. This leads to the following hypothesis, also in null form:
H2. Earnings surprises by a company should not be associated with larger stock price reactions than similar news announced
prior to Reg FD.
Our key expectation is that industry effects should be stronger after Reg FD was implemented because of the reduction
in preferential information prior to earnings announcements. If on average the type of information revealed by the ﬁrst
earnings announcement is likely to apply in a similar manner to other ﬁrms in the same industry, the stock price responses
of other ﬁrms should be in the same direction. This would represent the case for contagion. If on the other hand, the fate
of one ﬁrm in the industry indicates its unusually strong (weak) condition, then the stock price response of the other ﬁrms
would tend to be in the opposite direction. This would represent the competitive response. Whether the competitive or the
contagion case proves dominant, our third hypothesis, also in null form, is:
H3. Earnings surprises by a company should not be associated with larger stock price reactions for its industry rivals after
Reg FD than similar news announced prior to Reg FD.
3. Data and deﬁnition of variables
Our sample is based on the companies in the S&P 500 Index. For industry membership, we use the S&P Industry Sector
Code from COMPUSTAT database, developed by the Standard & Poor’s (S&P). The S&P Industry Sector Code consists of 128
industries as of 2013, an increase of 37 industries from just 91 in 1980. To examine the intra-industry effect of earnings
surprise news, we only include industries with at least four companies in S&P 500 index.
We use the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for these data: actual earnings per share (EPS), analysts’
average EPS forecasts, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, and companies’ earnings report dates.
To test whether earnings surprise news conveys signiﬁcant non-systematic information for reporting companies, we
examine the abnormal returns of the stock prices of companies that are ﬁrst (and in some cases, the second) in their industry
to announce earnings of a given quarter. Signiﬁcant non-zero abnormal returns would enable us to reject the null hypothesis
that quarterly earnings surprises have no impact on the reporting ﬁrm’s stock returns.
To measure the reaction of competitors in the same industry of a reporting company, we form an equally-weighted
portfolio of all other S&P 500 member ﬁrms with the same S&P Industry Sector Code. This procedure follows the methodology
of other studies, such as Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Prokopczuk (2010). In order to have similar number of observations
and length of sample period in both the pre- and the post-Reg FD periods, our sample period spans the years 1988–2012.
We construct two models of normalized earnings surprises (ESURPs) from the I/B/E/S database. The ﬁrst normalizes
the difference of actual quarterly EPS from the forecasted EPS with the absolute value of the actual EPS, and the second
normalizes the difference with the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of EPS. These methods are shown in Eqs. (1a) and
(1b), respectively;
Model 1:
1
ESURPj,t
= (AQj,t − FQj,t )/|AQj,t |

(1a)

Model 2:
2
ESURPj,t
= (AQj,t − FQj,t )/[FQ ]j,t

(1b)

Where
AQj,t = company j’s actual EPS for quarter t
FQj,t = most recent average analyst forecasted EPS for company j’s EPS of quarter t before actual EPS is announced
[FQ]j,t = standard deviation of all analyst forecasts used in computing the average analyst forecasted EPS for company
j’s EPS of quarter t
In our empirical analysis we use mainly earnings surprises deﬁned by the ﬁrst model in our reports because the standard
deviation of all analyst forecasts can be very small when just a few analysts follow a stock. Reports based on the second
model are available from authors upon request.
As stock prices may respond in an asymmetric fashion to positive or negative earnings announcements, many studies
examine positive and negative earnings surprises separately. While merely the sign of deviation of actual EPS from the
forecasted EPS is sufﬁcient for some studies, the exact magnitude or size of the earnings surprise is critical in testing the
hypothesis that stock prices respond more strongly to larger earnings surprise announcements than smaller ones.
Daily abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are adjusted for market risk using CRSP Value
Index Portfolio as a proxy for the market. The intercept and slope coefﬁcients of the market model are estimated over a
pre-announcement period of 250–50 days before the earnings announcement dates. Since most earnings announcements
are made after trading hours, it is customary to measure the full announcement effect in the two-day period including both
the announcement day (t = 0) and the next trading day after that (t = 1). The average cumulative abnormal returns are then
compared and tested for statistical signiﬁcance.
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4. Multivariate methodologies and tests
The abnormal returns analyses described above provide a ﬁrst look at the evidence on cumulative abnormal returns at
earnings announcements. Our key research question is to explore whether and how Reg FD affects the relation between
the earnings surprises and the responses of the stocks. To do this, we employ cross-sectional tests of stock price reactions
to earnings surprise news. This regression structure enables us to introduce and test the signiﬁcance of several additional
factors of interest jointly.
We begin with a regression of the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARj ) of reporting companies against two
variables: the size of the earnings surprise (ESURPj ) and a control variable based on ﬁrm size, measured by the log of the
market value of equities (ln(MVj )), of reporting ﬁrm j in Eq. (2).
CARj = ˛ + ˇ1 × ESURPj1or2 + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + εj

(2a)

Larger deviations from analysts’ forecasts may cause the market to respond more signiﬁcantly to the news. Market size
is included as a control variable because larger companies tend to attract more analysts than smaller companies, and it is
more difﬁcult to surprise the market as a whole with their regular quarterly earnings announcements.
We modify this structure to test for the existence of industry effects of earnings surprises. The dependent variable is
restated as the cumulative average abnormal return of the other ﬁrms in the reporting ﬁrm’s industry, and the subscript p
denotes variables deﬁned by industry.
CARp = ˛ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + εP

(2b)

We introduce control variables based on industry concentration and leverage. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks,
and Yoon (1998) use the Herﬁndahl Index (Hp ) of an industry as a proxy for the degree of imperfect competition. This index
is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of individual companies of the industry. Industries with nearly perfect
competition are believed to have more dominant industry contagion effects than competitive effects following earnings
news of individual companies. Lang and Stulz (1992) also argue that in industries where ﬁrms have high debt-to-asset ratios
(D/A), its member ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing ability to improve their competitive position is limited. (Also see Jorion and Zhang (2007).)
Building on Eqs. (2a) and (2b), this results in a structure that enables us to test for industry effects of the reporting ﬁrm’s
earnings surprise:
CARj = ˛ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + ˇ5 × Hp + ˇ6 × (D/A)p + εj

(3a)

CARp = ˛ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + ˇ5 × Hp + ˇ6 × (D/A)p + εP

(3b)

The three control variables are the size of the reporting ﬁrm, degree of industry concentration, and industry leverage.
Our main test is whether Reg FD affects the price impact of earnings surprises by reporting companies on their industry
rivals. We deﬁne a dummy variable Reg.FD with a value of 1 for earnings surprise news announced after the regulation took
effect, and a value of 0 otherwise. If the estimated coefﬁcient of this dummy variable is signiﬁcant, it would support the
hypothesis that this legislation has a signiﬁcant effect. Following Jackson and Madura (2007), we add an interaction term
(Reg.FD*ESURP), a product of the dummy variable Reg.FD and the magnitude of the earnings surprise ESURP, to capture the
possibility that investors may interpret earnings surprise news differently in the post-Reg FD era. The basic cross-sectional
model for the reporting ﬁrms is as follows:
CARj = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj )+
ˇ7 × Reg.FD + ˇ8 × Reg.FD ∗ ESURPj + εj

(4a)

Supplemented with the industry concentration and leverage variables, the model is as follows:
CARj = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + ˇ5 × Hp + ˇ6 × (D/A)p
ˇ7 × Reg.FD + ˇ8 × Reg.FD ∗ ESURPj + εP

(5a)

Both equations are written for the reporting ﬁrms, for convenience. Eqs. (4b) and (5b) for the industry rival ﬁrms are the
same except that the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the other ﬁrms in the industry, CARp rather
than for the reporting ﬁrm, CARj .
5. Empirical evidence on the existence of industry effects
We ﬁrst test whether the earnings surprises of the ﬁrst-to-report companies are associated with responses among their
industry rivals. Signiﬁcant abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns of rival ﬁrms in windows surrounding earnings
announcement dates would enable us to reject the null hypothesis that earnings surprise news has no impact on rival ﬁrms’
stock prices. Daily abnormal returns are deﬁned as the residuals from the market model, Ri,t = ␣i + ␤i Rm,t + εi,t , where Ri,t
is stock i’s return on day t, and Rm is the market return. Coefﬁcients are estimated in the window [t-250, t-50] relative to
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Table 1
Stock Price Responses to Quarterly Earnings Announcements: First-to-report versus Industry Competitors.
Event Period

Positive Earnings Surprises

Negative Earnings Surprises
Average Abnormal
Return (%)

Proportion
Positive (%)

z-value

−0.76
−1.24
−0.70

41.0
39.7
43.3

−10.495
−11.962
−5.636

Panel B: Industry Competitor Firms, 1988-2012 (Positive N = 5,357, Negative N = 2,843)
[0,0]
0.10
50.6
4.266
−0.09
0.11
50.4
3.075
−0.10
[0,+1]
0.00
48.5
−0.042
−0.17
[−11, −1]

45.9
46.4
46.5

−2.636
−1.967
−1.577

Average Abnormal
Return (%)

Proportion
Positive (%)

z-value

Panel A: Reporting Firms, 1988-2012 (Positive N = 5,357, Negative N = 2,843)
0.62
56.6
12.742
[0,0]
0.92
57.0
12.733
[0,+1]
0.43
51.4
5.237
[-11, −1]

Earnings surprises are deﬁned as the difference between the actual quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) and analysts’ consensus EPS estimate, scaled by the
absolute value of the actual EPS. Abnormal returns (ARs) are calculated as residuals of the market-adjusted model, where coefﬁcients are estimated in the
window [t-250, t-50] relative to announcement date t. Cumulative ARs (CARs) are calculated over three event windows. Average ARs and CARs are tested
for signiﬁcance using a 2-tailed z-test.

earnings announcement day t. Cumulative abnormal returns over three windows, [−11, −1], [0,0], and [0,+1], are calculated
and reported. Cross-sectional average ARs and CARs are tested for signiﬁcance using a 2-tailed z-test.
Earnings surprises are expressed as the difference between the actual quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) and analysts’
consensus EPS estimate, scaled by the absolute value of the actual quarterly EPS. We analyze positive and negative earnings
surprises separately to allow for different effects of announcements on stock prices.
Table 1 summarizes the cross-sectional average daily ARs and CARs over three windows of earnings reporting ﬁrms
around their earnings announcement days. There are 5357 positive surprises and 2843 negative surprises in the entire
sample period, 1988–2012. As shown in Panel A, companies whose quarterly earnings beat analysts’ estimates experience
a signiﬁcant 0.62% [z = 12.742] daily average AR on the announcement day, and another signiﬁcant 0.30% [z = 5.726] on the
following day, for a total of 0.92% [z = 12.733] on the two days, [0,+1]. (The positive AR stops at day 2 after the announcement
day with a signiﬁcant 0.06% [z = 2.245], not shown). In addition, investors’ expectations also lead to signiﬁcantly positive
average daily ARs in the pre-announcement period, as the CAR for window [−11, −1] is 0.43% [z = 5.237], especially for the
four-day window [−4, −1] before announcement days.
Companies whose quarterly earnings are lower than analysts’ estimates experience a signiﬁcant −0.76% [z = −10.495]
daily average AR on the announcement day and another signiﬁcant −0.47% [z = −6.737] on the following day, for a total of
-1.24% [z = −11.962] on days [0,+1]. There is no other signiﬁcant negative AR after t + 1. The CAR for window [−11, −1] is
−0.70% [z = −5.636].
Overall, earnings surprises appear to be valid signals of information previously unknown to the market because they are
associated with signiﬁcant abnormal returns. Also, CARs over the [−11, −1] pre-announcement window appear to predict
the direction of earnings surprises well for both positive and negative surprises.
We next turn to the industry rivals. The empirical estimates of average daily ARs and CARs for these ﬁrms are summarized
in Table 1, Panel B. These ﬁrms experience a signiﬁcant 0.10% [z = 4.266] daily average AR on the announcement day but an
insigniﬁcant 0.01% [z = 0.293] on the following day. No signiﬁcant CARs are found in the pre-announcement period for rival
ﬁrms’ stocks, as the CAR for window [−11, −1] is 0.00% [z = −0.042]. There is also signiﬁcant negative −0.09% AR [z = −2.636]
on the announcement day for rival ﬁrms’ stock prices. Other ARs and CARs in both the pre- and post-announcement periods
are not signiﬁcant. Overall, positive earnings surprises lead to signiﬁcant abnormal returns for rival ﬁrms’ stocks on the
announcement days and some other days in the preceding 11 days. Similarly, negative news by the announcing ﬁrms has a
negative impact on their industry rivals’ stocks.
In summary, the earnings surprises show signiﬁcant stock return effects upon announcement for the reporting ﬁrms, and
signiﬁcant, although smaller, effects for their rivals. This enables us to reject H1, that the information released in earnings
announcements is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, with no industry implications. Thus, earnings surprises do appear to have informational
value about other ﬁrms in the same industry.
6. Univariate empirical analysis of Reg FD’s effects
For a ﬁrst view of the effects of Reg FD, we split the entire sample period into two sub-periods, 1988–1999 and 2001–2012,
based on its adoption in October, 2000. Results for the reporting ﬁrms based on the pre-Reg FD period are presented in
Table 2, Panel A, and results based on the post-Reg FD period are presented in Panel B. Due to an increase in the number
of industries, there are signiﬁcantly more observations in the post-Reg FD than in the pre-Reg FD period. There are 1909
(1551) cases of positive (negative) earnings surprises in 1988–1999, and 3263 (1210) cases of positive (negative) earnings
surprises in 2001–2012. (The total numbers of surprises are slightly lower than shown in Table 1 because the year of Reg
FD’s implementation, 2000, is excluded from this part of the analysis.)
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Table 2
Stock Price Responses to Quarterly Earnings Announcements: Before and After Implementation of Reg FD.
Event Period

Positive Earnings Surprises

Negative Earnings Surprises
Average Abnormal
Return (%)

Proportion
Positive (%)

z-value

Panel A: Reporting Firms, 1988-1999 (Positive N = 1909, Negative N = 1551)
0.60
57.1
8.459
[0,0]
0.84
56.9
8.261
[0,+1]
0.45
50.1
3.158
[−11, −1]

−0.55
−0.82
−0.92

43.1
43.1
42.5

−6.731
−6.825
−5.836

Panel B: Reporting Firms, 2001-2012 (Positive N = 3263, Negative N = 1210)
[0,0]
0.63
56.3
9.517
0.96
57.0
9.677
[0,+1]
0.37
51.7
3.758
[-11, −1]

-1.09
-1.83
-0.45

37.6
34.5
44.0

-8.657
-10.258
-2.213

Panel C: Industry Competitor Firms, 1988-1999 (Positive N = 1909, Negative N = 1551)
0.03
47.3
0.830
−0.04
[0,0]
0.02
48.0
0.351
−0.05
[0,+1]
−0.11
46.5
−0.961
−0.30
[−11, −1]

46.7
46.6
45.9

−1.086
−0.854
−2.406

Panel D: Industry Competitor Firms, 2001-2012 (Positive N = 3263, Negative N = 1210)
0.13
52.3
4.321
−0.17
[0,0]
[0,+1]
0.15
51.5
3.104
−0.18
-0.02
49.0
−0.266
−0.18
[-11, −1]

44.6
46.0
46.4

−2.715
−1.975
−1.001

Average Abnormal
Return (%)

Proportion
Positive (%)

z-value

Panel E: Differences between ARs and CARs of Reporting and Industry Competitor Firms, 1988–1999
0.57
5.323
−0.51
[0,0]
[0,+1]
0.82
5.168
−0.77
[-11, −1]
0.56
2.179
−0.62

−4.302
−4.309
−2.196

Panel F: Differences between ARs and CARs of Reporting and Industry Competitor Firms, 2001–2012
[0,0]
0.50
5.193
−0.92
0.81
5.490
−1.65
[0,+1]
0.39
2.246
−0.27
[-11, −1]

−4.880
−6.122
−0.705

Earnings surprises are deﬁned as the difference between the actual quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) and analysts’ consensus EPS estimate, scaled by the
absolute value of the actual EPS. Abnormal returns (ARs) are calculated as residuals of the market-adjusted model, where coefﬁcients are estimated in the
window [t-250, t-50] relative to announcement date t. Cumulative ARs (CARs) are calculated over three event windows. Average ARs and CARs are tested
for signiﬁcance using a 2-tailed z-test.

It appears that it becomes easier for ﬁrms to beat analysts’ earnings estimates post-Reg FD. The average CAR over the
two-day [0,+1] event window of ﬁrms reporting positive earnings surprises increases from 0.84% (z = 8.261) in Panel A to
0.96% (z = 9.677) in the post-Reg FD-period in Panel B. For ﬁrms reporting negative earnings surprises, it changes from −0.82%
(z = −6.825) in Panel A to −1.83% (z = −10.258) in Panel B. Investors appear to react more strongly to earnings news in the
post-Reg FD period than in the pre-Reg FD period.
As for the time leading up to the announcements, CARs are lower before the announcement. For example, the average
CAR over the [−11, −1] window of ﬁrms reporting positive earnings surprises drops from 0.45% (z = 3.158) in Panel A to
0.37% (z = 3.758) in Panel B and moves from −0.92% (z = −5.836) to −0.45% (z = −2.213) for ﬁrms reporting negative earnings
surprises.
We next examine the results of rival ﬁrms into the pre-Reg FD period (Panel C) and the post-Reg FD period (Panel D).
The ﬁndings are similar to those of the reporting ﬁrms in that the adoption of the Reg FD in 2000 also leads to larger
announcement-period CARs for industry rival ﬁrms. For example, the average CAR over the two-day [0,+1] event window
of rival ﬁrms of ﬁrms reporting positive earnings surprises increases from 0.02% (z = 0.351) in Panel C to 0.15% (z = 3.104)
in Panel D, and the average CAR over the two-day [0,+1] event window of rival ﬁrms of ﬁrms reporting negative earnings
surprises changes from −0.05% (z = −0.854) to −0.18% (z = −1.975) in Panel D.
Panel E reports data on the differences between the CARs of the reporting and competitive ﬁrms before Reg FD took
effect, and Panel F reports the equivalent after Reg FD. The differences are signiﬁcant, and generally the same before and
after Reg FD took effect for the positive earnings surprises. The differences are also signiﬁcant for the negative surprises,
but larger. On average the difference in event days [0,+1] for these negative surprises was larger after than before: −0.77
before, and −1.65 after. The post-Reg FD period includes the ﬁnancial crisis, and bad news might have travelled faster in
that challenging environment.
In summary, earnings announcement effects are somewhat stronger after the introduction of Reg FD than before for
both the reporting ﬁrms and their rivals. This enables us to reject H2. We now turn to multivariate analysis of the earnings
surprises and abnormal returns.
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Table 3
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Announcement Effects. Controlling for Industry Concentration and Leverage.

Intercept
ESURP
ln(MV)

(1) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(2) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(3) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(4) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

1.1235
[0.001]***
2.1154
[0.000]***
−0.1160
[0.001]***

0.0419
[0.792]
0.1917
[0.003]***
−0.0005
[0.978]

0.0065
4.7660

0.0002
2.1438

1.3800
[0.000] ***
2.1150
[0.000] ***
−0.1214
[0.001] ***
−0.3568
[0.441]
−0.3619
[0.229]
0.0067
4.7666

0.0477
[0.793]
0.1916
[0.003]***
−0.0004
[0.982]
0.0475
[0.832]
−0.0445
[0.759]
0.0002
2.1442

Herﬁndahl
D/A
R2
SE

Note: *, **, *** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, using as two-tailed test.
Ordinary least squares regression analyses are conducted using the 2-day [0,+1] event-window CAR as the dependent variable, and independent variables
based on earnings surprises (ESURP), market value of the announcing ﬁrm (ln(MV)), the Herﬁndahl Index (Herﬁndahl), and industry Debt-Asset ratio (D/A).
Estimated coefﬁcients and their associated p-values are presented.

7. Multivariate empirical analysis of Reg FD’s effects
Table 3 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis based on Eqs. (2a) and (2b) and Eqs. (3a) and
(3b) for the 2-day CARs of the announcing and rival ﬁrms. We ﬁrst examine the relationship between CARs and earnings
surprises while controlling for size of the announcing ﬁrms using Eqs. (2a) and (2b). For the announcing ﬁrms, all three
estimated coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% conﬁdence level, as seen in Table 3, Column 1. The
positive 1.1235% intercept suggests that on average, the ﬁrst ﬁrm in the industry to report its quarterly earnings gains a
positive 2-day CAR relative to the other ﬁrms in its industry. The coefﬁcient of the ESURP variable conﬁrms that the 2-day
CARs are positively correlated with the magnitude of the surprises. The negative −0.1150 coefﬁcient of the ln(MV) suggests
that smaller announcing ﬁrms tend to do better than announcing ﬁrms with relatively larger market capitalizations in this
2-day window. As shown in Table 3, Column 2, the 2-day CARs of the rival ﬁrms are positively associated with the earnings
surprises of the announcing ﬁrms. Otherwise, they are on average zero, as evidenced by the fact that the intercept term is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Following Eqs. (2a) and (2b), we add two additional factors, the Herﬁndahl Index (H) and the industry debt-to-asset
ratio (D/A). However, due to their corresponding insigniﬁcant p-values, we conclude that neither of these industry variables
provides any additional explanatory power for the CARs. (See Table 3, Columns 3 and 4.) Therefore, industry concentration
and leverage do not contribute any explanatory power to the 2-day event-window CARs for either the reporting ﬁrms or
their rivals.
Our key analysis is to examine the relation between returns and earnings surprises before and after Reg FD. We deﬁne
the dummy variable Reg.FD with a value of one if earnings announcements in question are made after its implementation in
October, 2000, and zero otherwise. We also deﬁne the interaction variable Reg.FD * ESURP, as in Eqs. (4a) and (4b), and Eqs.
(5a) and (5b). The regression results are summarized in Table 4.
For the reporting ﬁrms, the intercept and the estimated coefﬁcients of ESURP and ln(MV) and their p-values in Columns
1 and 3 are qualitatively similar to those of their counterparts in Table 3. The signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of Reg.FD, −0.1941 in
Column 1 and −0.1818 in Column 3, indicate the 2-day event-window CARs are lower after the adoption of Reg FD. The
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of Reg.FD * ESURP, 1.7751 in Column 1 and 1.7732 in Column 3, indicate that the market rewards
positive surprises more in the post-Reg RD era than before. This suggests that the adoption of Reg FD is associated with
better rewards for stronger-than-expected earnings, and stronger punishment for weaker-than-expected earnings.
The adoption of Reg FD also results in a change of the single signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for rival ﬁrms’ 2-day CARs from variable
ESURP to the interaction variable Reg.FD * ESURP, as seen in Table 4, Columns 2 and 4. This is important because it indicates
that the industry effects are more signiﬁcant after Reg FD was imposed than before. It enables us to reject H3, and is the
basis for our conclusion that even if there was industry-relevant information in ﬁrms’ earnings surprises before Reg FD was
implemented, market participants didn’t make use of it until Reg FD made other sources of information unavailable.

8. Robustness and related tests
We supplement our basic ﬁndings with three related empirical robustness tests. We ﬁrst test whether the second earnings
announcement in an industry in a given quarter contains additional information over and above that revealed by the ﬁrst
announcement. To test for this, we deﬁne a dummy variable, SECONDj, with a value of one when the earnings announcement
is the second in the industry in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. We also deﬁne an interaction term, deﬁned as the product
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Table 4
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Announcement Effects to Test for Effects of the Implementation of Reg FD.

Intercept
ESURP
ln(MV)

(1) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(2) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(3) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(4) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

0.8995
[0.008]***
1.4139
[0.000]***
−0.0844
[0.030]**

−0.0038
[0.981]
0.0904
[0.281]
0.0065
[0.728]

−0.1941
[0.070]*
1.7751
[0.000]***
0.0086
4.7619

−0.0460
[0.375]
0.2600
[0.049]**
0.0002
2.1442

1.1349
[0.003]***
1.4133
[0.000]***
−0.0907
[0.021]**
-0.2878
[0.533]
-0.3373
[0.263]
−0.1818
[0.091]*
1.7732
[0.000]***
0.0087
4.7627

−0.0050
[0.979]
0.0900
[0.283]
0.0067
[0.723]
0.0612
[0.784]
−0.0368
[0.801]
−0.0457
[0.381]
0.2606
[0.049]**
0.0003
2.1446

Herﬁndahl
D/A
Reg.FD
Reg.FD*ESURP
R2
SE

Note: *, **, *** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, using as two-tailed test.
Ordinary least squares regression analyses are conducted using the 2-day [0,+1] event-window CARs as the dependent variables. Independent variables
include earnings surprises (ESURP), market value of the announcing ﬁrm (ln(MV)), the Herﬁndahl Index (Herﬁndahl), the industry Debt-Asset ratio (D/A).
An indicator variable for the implementation of Reg FD in October, 2000, has a value of zero for earnings announcements before 2000, and a value of 1 for
announcements after 2000. Also included is an interaction term for earnings surprises and Reg.FD. Estimated coefﬁcients and their associated p-values are
presented.
Table 5
Test of Signiﬁcance of Industry Information Revealed in the First vs. the Second Earnings Announcements in an Industry in a Given Quarter.

Intercept
ESURP
ln(MV)
SECOND
SECOND*ESURP
R2
SE

(1) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(2) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

0.6784
[0.004]***
0.1135
[0.000]***
−0.0619
[0.015]**
+0.0112
[0.876]
−0.0647
[0.105]
0.0032
4.8677

0.1173
[0.287]
0.1512
[0.001]***
−0.0135
[0.261]
−0.0403
[0.226]
+0.0009
[0.951]
0.0003
2.1467

Note: *, **, *** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, using as two-tailed test.
Ordinary least squares regression analyses are conducted using Eqs. (6a) and (6b). The dependent variable is the 2-day [0,+1] event-window CAR of the
reporting ﬁrm. The independent variables include the earnings surprise ESURP of the reporting ﬁrm, its market value (ln(MV)), and a dummy variable
SECOND indicating whether it is the ﬁrst (value is zero) or the second (value is one) in the industry to report its earnings. Estimated coefﬁcients and their
associated p-values are presented.

of the dummy variable SECONDj and the magnitude of the earnings surprise ESURPj . Adding these to Eqs. (2a) and (2b) yields
Eqs. (6a) and (6b).
CARj = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj )+
ˇ3 × SECONDj + ˇ4 × SECONDj ∗ ESURPj + εj
CARp = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj )+
ˇ3 × SECONDj + ˇ4 × SECONDj ∗ ESURPj + εP

(6a)

(6b)

If the estimated coefﬁcient on SECOND or its interaction with earnings surprises ESURP is signiﬁcant, that would indicate
that the second announcement has informational value. If these coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant, it appears that the second
announcement does not reveal more industry information, and we can focus on only the ﬁrst earnings announcement.
Table 5 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis based on Eqs. (6a) and (6b). Based on their
low p-values in this regression, the second earnings news in the industry (SECOND) and the interaction term (SECOND*ESURP)
relative to the ﬁrst earnings news in the industry do not appear to provide any clear additional explanatory power of the
CARs. In our empirical analysis we therefore use only the ﬁrst earnings announcement of a ﬁrm in a given industry each
quarter.
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Table 6
Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Announcement Effects Controlling for Consistency between Earnings and Sales Announcements.

Intercept
ESURP
ln(MV)

(1) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(2) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(3) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(4) Rival Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

1.4187
[0.017]**
3.0753
[0.000]***
−0.1353
[0.028]**

0.1639
[0.548]
0.2850
[0.011]**
−0.0104
[0.711]

−0.4080
[0.009]***
0.0440
[0.637]
0.0070
5.3725

−0.0632
[0.376]
0.0536
[0.209]
0.0008
2.3322

1.5026
[0.025]**
3.0744
[0.000]***
−0.1389
[0.025]**
−0.3685
[0.608]
0.0698
[0.883]
−0.4065
[0.009]***
0.0427
[0.647]
0.0086
5.3585

0.2006
[0.513]
0.2848
[0.011]**
−0.0111
[0.697]
−0.0038
[0.991]
−0.0796
[0.714]
−0.0623
[0.384]
0.0537
[0.209]
0.0013
2.3381

Herﬁndahl
D/A
OPSS
OPSS*ESURP
R2
SE

Note: *, **, *** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, using as two-tailed test.
Ordinary least squares regression analyses are conducted using the 2-day [0,+1] event-window CARs as the dependent variable. Independent variables
include earnings surprises (ESURP), market value of the announcing ﬁrm (ln(MV)), the Herﬁndahl Index (Herﬁndahl), the industry Debt-Asset ratio (D/A).
An indicator variable for consistency between earnings and sales announcements, OPSS, is also included. It has a value of zero for if the direction of the
earnings and sales surprises are the same, and a value of one otherwise. Also included is an interaction term for consistency and the amount of earnings
surprise. Estimated coefﬁcients and their associated p-values are presented.

Next, it frequently happens that a company’s earnings surprise news is contradicted by its sales surprise news from
the same quarterly report. Thus it is of interest to examine whether a contradictory sales surprise impacts the effect of an
earnings surprise news and the sensitivity of the stock price response to the size of ESURP. Therefore, a dummy variable OPSS
(opposite sales surprise) and an interaction term OPSS*ESURP are added. The variable OPSS has a value of one if two types of
news contradict each other, and zero otherwise. Due to its shorter history in the I/B/E/S database, the following two models
are tested only for the 2001–2012 period.
CARj = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj )+
ˇ9 × OPSSj + ˇ10 × OPSSj ∗ ESURPj + εj
CARj = ␣ + ˇ1 × ESURPj + ˇ2 × ln(MVj ) + ˇ5 × Hp + ˇ6 × (D/A)p
ˇ9 × OPSSj + ˇ10 × OPSSj ∗ ESURPj + εP

(7a)

(8a)

As earlier, we also deﬁne Eqs. (7b) and (8b), which are the same as Eqs. (7a) and (8a), except that the dependent variable
is the CAR for the industry rivals, CARp , rather than for the reporting ﬁrm, CARj .
The intercept and estimated coefﬁcients of ESURP and ln(MV) and their p-values in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 are
economically similar to those of their counterparts in Table 4. The signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of OPSS, −0.4080 in Column 1
and −0.4065 in Column 3, indicate the smaller 2-day event-window CARs received by the leading announcing ﬁrms if the
earnings and sales surprises are in opposite directions. No signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of OPSS * ESURP are found.
Our third robustness test focusses on the potentially confounding effects from other events that took place close to
the time of Reg FD’s implementation. The Sarbanes/Oxley legislation to strengthen corporate governance became effective
in mid-2002. The Global Analyst Settlement became effective in April, 2003. Of these two events, the one more likely
to affect earnings announcement effects on stock prices and returns is Sarbanes/Oxley because it should be associated
with cleaner and more accurate earnings disclosures. The Global Settlement deals most speciﬁcally with IPO pricing and
analyst recommendations, is therefore less likely to affect stock responses to earnings surprises. To test for the effect of
Sarbanes/Oxley, we add a dummy variable to Eqs. (4a) and (5a). The results for the reporting ﬁrms are summarized in
Table 7. The SOX dummy variable is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that the effects of earnings announcement on other ﬁrms in
the industry may be attributed to the implementation of Reg FD rather than to Sarbanes/Oxley.
9. Summary and conclusions
When S&P 500 companies lead their industry rivals in surprising the market with earnings better (worse) than analysts’
forecasts, their stock prices are rewarded (punished) with signiﬁcant positive (negative) cumulative abnormal returns in
a 2-day window. The signiﬁcant positive (negative) daily abnormal returns seldom extend beyond the second day after
announcement day (t + 2). Rival ﬁrms also experience signiﬁcant positive CARs in the 2-day window following positive
earnings news by the announcing ﬁrms, although the magnitude of the response is smaller.
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Table 7
Estimate of Potential Confounding Effects of Sarbanes/Oxley.

Intercept
ESURP
ln(MV)

(1) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

(2) Announcing Firms
Coefﬁcient [p-value]

0.9591
0.031**
0.3320
0.000***
−0.0793
0.127

0.8665
0.073*
0.3320
0.000***
−0.0807
0.121
0.2470
0.724
0.1689
0.676
−0.3895
0.190
0.3246
0.101
0.0261
0.930
0.0080
4.8016

Herﬁndahl
D/A
Reg.FD
Reg.FD*ESURP
SOX
R2
SE

−0.3844
0.195
0.3261
0.100*
0.0227
0.939
0.0079
4.8008

Note: *, **, *** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively, using as two-tailed test.
Ordinary least squares regression analyses are conducted using the 2-day [0,+1] event-window CARs as the dependent variable. Independent variables
include earnings surprises (ESURP), market value of the announcing ﬁrm (ln(MV)), the Herﬁndahl Index (Herﬁndahl), and the industry Debt-Asset ratio
(D/A). An indicator variable for the implementation of Reg FD in October 2000 is included. It has a value of zero for earnings announcements before
2000, and a value of 1 for announcements after 2000. Also included is an interaction term for earnings surprises and Reg.FD. An indicator variable for the
implementation of the Sarbanes/Oxley legislation is also included, SOX. It has a value of zero for earnings announcements on or before Q2 2002, and values
of one for earnings announcements on or after Q3 2002. Estimated coefﬁcients and their associated p-values are presented.

In regard to the implementation of Reg FD in 2000, the CARs in the pre-announcement [−11, −1] window are lower after
adoption than in the pre-Reg FD period, suggesting that there is less anticipation in advance of the announcements. Since the
CARs in the announcement [0,+1] window are higher than in the pre-Reg FD period, investors appear to react more strongly
to earnings news in the post-Reg FD period.
We also break down the results of rival ﬁrms into pre-Reg FD period and post-Reg FD period, and the comparisons are
similar to those of the reporting ﬁrms. We ﬁnd less anticipation of future earnings announcements and that the 2-day
abnormal returns around earnings announcements are larger after Reg FD was implemented. We interpret this as consistent
with analysts having less private information at the time of the announcements, consistent with the fundamental aim of
Reg FD to help level the informational playing ﬁeld.
The adoption of Reg FD is associated with smaller 2-day announcement period CARs for earnings announcing ﬁrms, but a
signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient for the interaction variable Reg.FD * ESURP. This suggests a stronger association between the
magnitude of the earnings surprises and the 2-day announcement period CARs for announcing ﬁrms. The results for rival
ﬁrms are similar, and are signiﬁcant at the 0.049 level of conﬁdence.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that earnings announcement surprises have signiﬁcant contagion effects on
the returns other ﬁrms in the industry and provide new evidence of the effects of Reg FD. More fundamentally, we conclude
that one way in which Reg FD has impacted the informational environment is to cause market participants to utilize industry
information more intensively than previously. This reﬂects one way in which analysts and other investors have sought new
sources of information to supplement or replace information previously available to them.
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